sBOLD is an ERC-4626 vault built by K3 Capital on top of Liquity V2. Depositors supply BOLD, Liquity's stablecoin, and receive shares redeemable for a proportional part of the vault's assets. The vault spreads deposits across Liquity's stability pools, which absorb liquidated debt and receive collateral in return. Before the attack it held about 3.429 million BOLD.
Between 12:25 and 12:33 UTC on 18 November 2026, attackers took about 3.43 million BOLD, nearly everything. The vault was paused at 13:05 UTC. K3 Capital published a post-mortem and recovery plan on X on 19 November, with the technical analysis carried out by ChainSecurity.
How the share price was inflated
The vault's share price is its total assets divided by its shares, and total assets include any collateral the vault holds. Anyone can call the vault's public swap() function to convert that collateral to BOLD through the 1inch router. The vault approves the router to take the collateral, passes along the caller's order, and checks that it received at least the oracle value minus 0.5 percent.
According to the post-mortem, each attack transaction flash-borrowed wstETH from Morpho and a little WETH from Balancer, opened a Liquity trove and borrowed several times the vault's assets in BOLD. The attacker then repeated a round several times. It deposited the BOLD to hold most of the shares, sent 4 WETH to the vault as a plain transfer, then called swap() with a crafted order that delivered the expected BOLD but sold no WETH. The BOLD acted as a second donation. The attacker redeemed its shares at the inflated price, then called swap() again with a dust amount of wstETH and an order that told the router to take the 4 WETH out of the vault, using the approval left over from the fake swap.
Because the attacker held more than half of the shares, it recovered most of both donations on redemption and then took the WETH back in full.
Root cause
In K3's words, the root cause is a token approval that the vault left in place after a swap that never took the collateral. The swap logic did not check that the adapter actually took the collateral, and it did not reset the allowance to zero afterwards. The router's generic swap function let the caller choose the token sold and the executor contract, so nothing tied the order to the collateral the vault had approved.
Two early claims did not hold up. Blockaid's first alert described self-liquidated Liquity troves, and other early analysis pointed to collateral left out of the share price. The post-mortem says no Liquity branch emitted a liquidation event during the drain, and the troves were opened and closed within each transaction only as a source of BOLD. Liquity said V2 and BOLD were unaffected.
Why it took about 100 transactions
The vault refuses redemptions while it holds more than 7,500 BOLD of collateral, which capped each round at about 7,460 BOLD, and gas limits capped rounds per transaction. Once the first transaction landed, others copied it. K3 counts ten attacker operators across 99 transactions, including a generalized MEV bot. Competing for inclusion, they paid about 986 ETH, roughly 1.77 million BOLD and more than half of the loss, to block builders, who passed it on to 21 validator fee recipients.
Recovery
K3 says it has identified nine counterparties holding 894.50 ETH and 131,316 yBOLD from the exploit, and that some, including Bitcoin Suisse and Yearn, have committed to the recovery. It offers a 15 percent bounty on returned funds, collected at a single designated address, and plans to convert recoveries to BOLD and redeem affected clients case by case. Pendle users with sBOLD exposure were also hit, and that loss has not been quantified.
Share accounting keeps failing in the same way
This is a familiar pattern. When a vault's share price counts assets that anyone can add, and its users can trigger value-moving calls with their own data, the price becomes something an attacker can move within a single transaction. Flash loans remove the capital barrier, and public mempools turn one successful exploit into a race that copycats and builders can profit from.
For builders, the lessons are concrete: verify both sides of a swap, reset approvals after every external call, and be cautious about counting donated assets in the share price. For depositors, the useful questions are whether a vault exposes permissionless functions that move its assets, and how quickly it can pause. Here, the pause came about 40 minutes after the first attack transaction, when 99.9 percent of the assets were already gone.
The full due-diligence checklist for vaults and yield wrappers is part of the upcoming Advanced Security Academy.
Sources: K3 Capital post-mortem and recovery plan on X, 19 November 2026 (analysis by ChainSecurity); Liquity post on X, 19 November 2026; Blockaid alert, 18 November 2026; Bitquery and SigIntZero analyses, 18 to 19 November 2026; The Crypto Times and CryptoWatchDesk, 19 November 2026.