On 14 November 2026, Kava Lend, also called HARD Lend, was drained through its market for BUSD, a stablecoin that had been nearly idle since minting stopped in 2023. Kava's official incident report, published on 16 November, says approximately 53.9 million KAVA was taken from the lending application. The report says the incident was confined to HARD Lend, did not compromise Kava Chain itself, and did not create new KAVA tokens.

How the attack worked

Kava Lend updates what depositors have earned by dividing accrued interest by the market's net supply. The Block, reviewing Kava's public source code, reported that the calculation skips this division when net supply is exactly zero, but not when it is only a tiny positive amount.

According to on-chain analysis by The Block and Bitquery, the attacker used a small BUSD loan to drive that net supply down to a minute residual, then saw the BUSD supply interest index rise roughly 243,000-fold in about three minutes. BUSD the attacker had already deposited was then treated as far larger collateral. The Block says the protocol counted it as roughly 1.25 billion BUSD.

The attacker then borrowed KAVA against that inflated collateral. The Block and Bitquery both count 127 KAVA loans. The Block reports that a second account liquidated each loan, which had the effect of clearing the debt and getting around Kava Lend's cap on KAVA borrowing. Bitquery describes the same pattern: a liquidation erased each loan, and the helper wallet kept the coins.

This is a high-level account of what public analyses have already described. It is not a reconstruction of how to repeat the attack.

The figures, and why they differ

The Block reported that about 55.2 million KAVA was drained, worth roughly $3.76 million at a pre-attack price of $0.068, and that the Kava Lend module account fell from 55.33 million KAVA to 0.19 KAVA in a little over 90 minutes.

Bitquery also puts the amount borrowed at 55.2 million KAVA in 127 loans over 98 minutes, and says the pool went from 55.3 million KAVA to 519 KAVA. After repayments of other loans in the market, Bitquery says the two wallets kept 53.9 million KAVA, worth about $3.7 million at that morning's price. That 53.9 million figure is the one Kava uses in its official report, and the one DefiLlama records as stolen, valuing it at $3.7 million before the later selloff.

The gap between 55.2 million borrowed and 53.9 million kept is therefore a difference of measure, not a contradiction: one is the gross amount taken from the pool, the other is what remained with the attackers after some loans were repaid. The residual pool balances reported by The Block (0.19 KAVA) and Bitquery (519 KAVA) also differ slightly.

Kava's report says individual user deposits were largely unaffected. That should be read alongside the on-chain picture of the KAVA pool itself, which both The Block and Bitquery describe as nearly emptied.

Where the funds went

Kava and The Block both say about 49.2 million KAVA was bridged to BNB Chain through LayerZero. The Block reports that most of it was sold within an hour for 3,006.5 BNB and 231,557 USDT, together worth about $2.09 million, and that another roughly 4.58 million KAVA went to five addresses on Kava. Bitquery says a third wallet sold 48.4 million KAVA on BNB Chain in 35 minutes for about $2.09 million, and that 4.4 million KAVA had already gone to exchanges and a swap service before that sale. The two sale figures describe slightly different slices of the same flow: 49.2 million bridged, and 48.4 million sold in the main dump.

Bitquery and DefiLlama both report that 612,416 USDT of the proceeds was blocked at the Relay bridge. Bitquery says Relay marked the order BLOCKED_WALLET and paid out no ETH.

Kava later paused the Axelar bridge as a precaution. The Block notes that the drained KAVA had already left through LayerZero. Bitquery, citing Crypto Briefing, says Upbit, Bithumb and Coinone halted KAVA transfers.

What Kava has done

Kava says the identified exploit has been blocked and that protective measures are in force to stop it being repeated. A portion of the attacker's funds has already been frozen, and Kava says it is working with ecosystem participants, exchanges, other venues and law enforcement to trace, freeze and recover the rest.

The report names three principal addresses: kava1uzx5924cqsutcw365ajs8kkc3rr4vtlyzms255 and kava1v2s266sll8ca5xrs06swmsc00nwwt7u77eufk4 on Kava, and 0x37d732914f86cc6eb1e87419e3046a739f011042 on BNB Chain.

Kava also plans to accelerate the retirement of HARD Lend's legacy lending function. A governance proposal will be submitted to permanently disable new lending and borrowing, followed by a seven-day vote. Remaining user positions, Kava says, will be wound down through a separate process. The report does not set out a reimbursement plan for the drained KAVA pool.

What this leaves open

A market that is still listed, but barely used, is not a harmless leftover. If an interest index can be repriced by a near-zero denominator, every deposit in that market can become synthetic collateral against the rest of the protocol. The public analyses already show why a check for exactly zero is not enough.

The rest of the defensive work is specific. It includes when to shut down a dormant or delisted market, what sanity bounds belong on an interest-index update, how a borrow cap should behave when loans are being opened and cleared in a loop, and how to watch residual supply before it gets small enough to matter. Those checks, and the rest of the audit checklist, are part of the Advanced Security Academy. The waitlist is open at advancedsecurity.club.