On 21 October 2026, ZachXBT reported that two addresses belonging to an unnamed institution had lost a combined 973,000 MORPHO, worth about $2.3 million, a few hours earlier. Both thefts went through EIP-7702 account delegation transactions, and the stolen funds were deposited into Tornado Cash.
It was not the first hit. According to ZachXBT, one of the same addresses was drained of about $3.5 million on 9 October. Those funds came from claims on old cross-chain bridges, were moved from Ethereum to Zcash through NEAR Intents, and ended up in the Ironwood privacy pool. The victim has not been publicly confirmed, and we are not naming one.
The first drain, 9 October
The earlier theft was flagged on 10 October by BlockSec Phalcon. Balances that had sat unclaimed in two bridges for a long time were claimed and moved out of the address 0x4943…c9f4 in two transactions.
The first, at 20:13 UTC, moved about $1.33 million in USDT, USDC and DAI from Polygon's Agglayer bridge. The second, at 20:24 UTC, moved about $2.22 million in USDT from NEAR's Rainbow Bridge. BlockSec and The Defiant put the total at roughly $3.55 million.
Both transactions were submitted by a different address, 0x24a9, which had been funded with about 0.1 ETH from Tornado Cash earlier that day. In the same block as the second claim, 0x24a9 also cleared the victim's delegation, returning the address to a normal wallet.
At the time, BlockSec was careful. The EIP-7702 authorizations were valid on-chain, which proves the owner's key signed them, but not whether the owner meant to, was tricked, or had lost the key. With the second drain on 21 October and the Tornado Cash funding, ZachXBT now treats both events as thefts.
A public reminder
One detail stands out. Days before the first drain, an on-chain researcher known as stuckfunds.eth sent the address several messages telling the owner that about $3.55 million was still claimable from the two bridges, and how to claim it safely.
That was a good-faith warning. But on-chain messages are public. Anyone scanning the chain for forgotten balances could read the same note and see an address worth targeting. We have no evidence the attacker found the victim this way. It is a pattern worth noting: dormant, high-value addresses are being actively hunted, and public notices make them easier to find.
What EIP-7702 delegation does
EIP-7702 arrived with Ethereum's Pectra upgrade in May 2025. It lets a normal wallet, an externally owned account (EOA) controlled by a private key, point to smart contract code and run that code as if it were its own.
The owner does this by signing an authorization: a short message naming the contract to delegate to. Anyone can then submit that authorization in a transaction and pay the gas. From that moment, calls to the wallet run the delegated code, with full access to everything the wallet holds: its ETH, its tokens, its approvals, and any balance it can claim.
That is useful for features like batched transactions and gas sponsorship. It is also why a single malicious authorization is so dangerous. It doesn't approve one token or one transfer. It hands over the account's behaviour until someone changes the delegation again.
In this case, the delegation let 0x24a9 pay the gas, claim the bridge balances and move them out, each in a single transaction, through the victim's own address.
What we don't know yet
The key question is how the attacker got valid authorizations. There are two broad possibilities. Either the institution's private key was compromised, or someone with signing access was tricked into signing a delegation they didn't understand.
These lead to very different fixes. If the key is compromised, every asset linked to it is exposed, which would fit a second drain twelve days after the first. If it was a signing trick, the weakness is in the workflow and the wallet interface. No post-mortem has been published, so neither has been confirmed.
Free-tier takeaways
Treat any EIP-7702 authorization request as a full-account handover, not a routine signature. If you can't name the contract and say why you're delegating to it, don't sign.
Check your addresses. Block explorers such as Etherscan show whether an EOA is currently delegated and to what.
If an address has been drained once, assume the key is burned. Move everything that remains to a fresh address with a new key, and don't keep claiming or receiving funds on the old one.
The full breakdown, including how to detect malicious delegations, signing policies for institutional wallets, and an incident runbook for a compromised EOA, is in the Advanced Security academy. Join the waitlist to get access first.