On the morning of 20 November 2026, XMR1, a token that represents Monero on Hyperliquid's spot market, lost more than 99 percent of its value in about half an hour. Monero itself was not affected. The native coin and Hyperliquid's separate XMR perpetual contract kept trading near $480, according to CoinDesk. What failed was the token that stands in for Monero, and the account that controls its supply.
XMR1 is issued by Wagyu, a swap service that lets users move Monero onto Hyperliquid and back. Holders rely on Wagyu's bridge to exchange the token for real XMR. Hyperliquid's own token data shows that XMR1 has a fixed supply of 20 million, and that the entire supply was assigned at launch to a single deployer address, 0x207700bd207df757825f9193ef9c648c1c65e06a. Tokens reach users by leaving that account. Bitquery estimates the deployer still held about 93 percent of the supply before the incident.
What happened on chain
Hyperliquid's ledger shows a fresh address, 0x1464dacaceb0d511f9964cdac5eba50ea42220bf, receiving its first transfer at 03:38 UTC. The deployer then sent it XMR1 in three transfers: 100,000 tokens at 04:46 UTC, another 100,000 at 05:14 UTC and 5,000,000 at 05:16 UTC, for 5.2 million in total.
Scam Sniffer flagged the activity as a suspected theft at 05:50 UTC, reporting about $13.3 million sold into the order book and a fall from about $494 to about $1 in roughly 35 minutes. Lookonchain reported that the address had spent about 13.22 million USDC on 7,467 ETH. PeckShield counted 5.1 million XMR1 moved, about $12.8 million spent on 7,349 ETH, and 4,836 ETH sent onward to a second address. CertiK reported the proceeds were bridged to Ethereum. Bitquery puts the sales at 363,804 XMR1 for $13.50 million, matched against 388 buyers, with the USDC moved to Arbitrum, swapped for ETH and mostly bridged to Ethereum.
The figures differ slightly by source and time, but agree on the shape. Only a small part of the 5.2 million tokens was actually sold. When we checked Hyperliquid's API at about 11:50 UTC, the receiving address still held about 4.82 million XMR1 and about 219,000 USDC.
Who absorbed the loss
Every dollar the seller raised came from someone who bought on the way down. Wagyu's founder, who posts as PerpetualCow, wrote at 09:36 UTC that he was not completely sure what had happened, that market makers were hit hardest because they kept buying, that swap users suffered no loss, and that he was open to negotiating with whoever did it. At 11:31 UTC he called it a hack and said market makers who lost money would be refunded in full, and that he plans to relaunch. He has not explained how the transfers were signed, and he has not said what happens to remaining XMR1 holders or to pending bridge withdrawals. Hyperliquid has made no statement that we could find.
What is known about the cause, and what is not
On Hyperliquid, a token transfer is an action signed by the account's own key. Bitquery notes that the deployer has one named API wallet, called "wagyu", but API wallets can trade and cannot send tokens. That suggests whoever moved the 5.2 million tokens held the deployer's main key. It does not tell us whether that key was stolen, leaked from a server, or used by someone with legitimate access. The chain records the signature, not the consent behind it.
CoinDesk also notes that Wagyu disclosed a separate data leak on 28 October. No connection to this incident has been shown.
A wrapper is only as safe as the keys holding its supply
XMR1 did not need a smart contract bug to collapse. The design kept almost all of the unissued supply in one account, apparently controlled by one key, with nothing on chain to delay a large transfer. The same deployer address still holds almost all of ZEC1, Wagyu's Zcash token, according to Bitquery and Hyperliquid's balance data.
For holders, the practical lesson is to look past the price and ask where the supply sits. A wrapped asset is a claim on an issuer's reserves and on its operational security. Before holding one, check how much of the supply is held by the deployer, whether those holdings are locked or controlled by more than one signer, how redemption works and who can pause it, and whether reserves can be verified.
We will update this analysis when Wagyu publishes an explanation. The full checklist for assessing wrapped and bridged assets before you hold them is part of the upcoming Advanced Security Academy.
Sources: Hyperliquid info API (ledger and balances read 20 November 2026, about 11:50 UTC); Scam Sniffer, Lookonchain, CertiK and PeckShield posts on X, 20 November 2026; posts by Wagyu's founder PerpetualCow on X, 09:36 and 11:31 UTC, 20 November 2026; Bitquery investigation, 20 November 2026; CoinDesk, 20 November 2026.