Bloom, a Solana trading bot used through its Bloom Manager app and Chrome extension, says an attacker drained about 9,408 SOL, worth roughly $947,000, from 49 wallet addresses belonging to nine users late on Oct. 25 (U.S. time). On-chain data shows the main sweep completed in about 94 seconds, with every transfer signed by the affected wallet and sent to a single attacker address.

Bloom attributes the incident to a third-party module exploited through a remote code execution vulnerability. It says no private keys were accessed or compromised and that broader exposure of user wallets has been ruled out. It has not named the module or explained how transfers were signed without key access. Bloom took all systems offline, said users will need to log in again when service returns, and on Oct. 26 announced that all affected users had been reimbursed.

The lesson is that wallet-connected software inherits the security of every component it loads. If a single dependency can execute code in the environment that builds or signs transactions, it can move funds, whether or not the keys themselves are ever exported.

Defenses include isolating signing from the application runtime, strict review and pinning of third-party modules, and sandboxing anything that does not need access to transfer logic. Users of custodial or semi-custodial trading bots should keep only trading float in bot wallets and move funds to fresh wallets when a compromise is reported.