Electrum disclosed a high-severity vulnerability on Oct. 24, fixed in version 4.8.3, that malicious servers were already exploiting. When a user broadcast a transaction, a malicious server could withhold it and replace it in the wallet's history with a conflicting fake transaction paying the attacker. The fake had invalid signatures, but older clients did not check them for unconfirmed transactions, so the wallet displayed it as the user's own pending payment.

The trap was the fee bump. The attacker's fake transaction carried a zero fee, so it never confirmed. If the user then used replace-by-fee to speed it up, Electrum re-signed it with a higher fee, creating a valid payment to the attacker. Electrum received two reports: one user noticed the substitution, and another bumped the fee and lost funds. In both cases the attacker's address was ground to match the last four characters of the legitimate one.

The root issue is a documented trust assumption: light clients rely on their server for unconfirmed transaction data. Version 4.8.3 now verifies signatures on the wallet's own inputs in mempool transactions before adding them to history. Incoming unconfirmed transactions are still not fully validated, so server trust has not been removed entirely.

Users should update to 4.8.3, verify full output addresses and amounts before signing any transaction or fee bump, and treat partial address matches as unreliable. Running or connecting to a trusted server removes this exposure. For wallet developers, the lesson is to treat server-supplied data as untrusted input, especially when it feeds into a signing flow.