Initia halted its layer-1 network and rollups on Oct. 23 after an attacker exploited a bug in MoveVM script caching. According to Initia, the flaw let malicious code bypass security checks and spoof MoveVM state, crediting the attacker with unbacked WETH, iUSD and USDC without changing those tokens' total supply. No native INIT was minted, and Initia says INIT supply is unaffected.

Before the halt, the attacker bridged out roughly $2.7 million: 105 WETH and about 1.4 million AUSD0 through LayerZero, plus about 1.08 million USDC through Noble and Circle's CCTP. The proceeds were swapped into 1,135.52 ETH held in a single Ethereum wallet. Every bridge release was a validly attested message, because the destination side cannot tell a forged balance from a real one. Upbit and Bithumb have since designated INIT a trading-caution asset, with deposits and withdrawals suspended.

The vulnerability class is an execution-layer accounting flaw. When a VM caches the result of a security check and later reuses it for different code, invalid state can pass as valid. Cross-chain bridges then turn that local bookkeeping error into a real loss, because lockboxes on the other chain pay out at par for whatever the source chain reports.

Defenses start with rigorous auditing of VM caching and state-transition code, plus invariant monitoring that flags balances with no legitimate origin. Bridge rate limits and fast pause controls reduce the blast radius. As of Initia's Oct. 27 update, a fix was drafted and under external audit, with a recovery plan and phased restart to follow; no restart date or full post-mortem had been published.