zkLink published its first incident report on the Nova bridge exploit on November 3, 2026. It confirms SlowMist's analysis. The first attack, on Ethereum at 22:21 UTC on October 28, reused a verification value that the Arbitrator contract left in transient storage, used the trusted Ethereum gateway to install a forged batch root, and made 12 withdrawals with fabricated Merkle proofs. zkLink values that transaction at about $781K at current prices. SlowMist's original figure was about $783K.

A wider incident than first reported

A different address drained remaining Ethereum assets at 01:43 UTC on October 29. zkLink says that address also appears in public investigations of the X100 exploit, and that gas for both attackers traces back to FixedFloat hot wallets, but it has not confirmed common control. From 07:16 UTC, unauthorized withdrawals hit Nova contracts on Mantle, Optimism, Base and legacy contracts on Blast, all sent from one address to one recipient. zkLink found no evidence of theft on Arbitrum, zkSync Era, Manta or Scroll.

Why containment took hours

zkLink says the pause controls on its secondary-chain contracts covered deposits, not withdrawals, so halting block production could not close old withdrawal paths. It pushed emergency upgrades on eight chains between 09:14 and 11:38 UTC on October 29 and froze the Linea primary-chain contract at 12:23 UTC. It did not upgrade Blast, where it had stopped deposits but still held assets.

Takeaway

The zero-knowledge proofs were never broken. A trusted caller was. Bridge teams should clear transient state before each use, bind verification values to the current call, verify batch roots independently of who submits them, and make sure an emergency pause covers withdrawals on every deployment, including retired ones. zkLink says decisions on resuming service and on compensation will follow.

Sources: zkLink Nova Security Incident Report #1 (November 3, 2026); SlowMist analysis (October 31, 2026); Blockaid.